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Parties between Thresholds: State Subsidies and Party Behavior in Post-
communist Democracies 
 
Introduction 
 Much has been written about what makes political parties form, persist, change 
and die. The availability of resources, and one of its channels, the state financing of 
political parties, is seen as both a curse and a blessing for the persistence of parties 
and the encouragement of strong party competition by individual authors (Knapp, 
2004; Birnir, 2005; Casas-Zamora, 2006; Scarrow, 2006; Tavits, 2007; Spirova, 
2007). Without any state funding, small and private-resource poor parties have little 
chance of making it in the electoral competition. At the same time, extending the 
“cartelization” thesis (Katz and Mair, 1995), state funding that is only available to the 
established parties might, in fact, freeze the existing patterns of competition even 
more. Theoretically the relationship is complicated, while empirical evidence has 
further obfuscated the picture.  
 We argue that there are at least two reasons why existing work might fail to find 
a clear trend. One, the conceptualization of state funding as a constraint of party 
behavior is often too simplistic. A binary distinction between presence and absence of 
state funding will only allow for the examination of a very small part of the potential 
effect of state resources on party development. Peculiarities of the funding system - 
such as which parties receive state money and how important that money is for each 
party - will blur a clear link between funding and party system development.   
 Second, and probably more importantly for this article, resource availability 
impacts parties differently and its results might be evident only in some particular 
cases. The most consequential effect, in fact, will be on the parties that fall just under 
the electoral threshold for parliamentary representation and which have, thus, limited 
access to the mainstream political process. Whether or not they are supported by the 
financing system of the state becomes of greater consequence than for other parties. 
The presence of state financing will encourage them to look at politics from a longer-
term perspective and allow them to continue to function even outside parliament. 
Such parties, which we call parties “between thresholds” since they fall between the 
electoral and payout (i.e. financing) thresholds, are more likely to persist in the 
electoral competition and (re-)enter parliament at a later stage than parties which do 
not receive such support.  
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 Such parties are also those that more often than not get excluded as irrelevant 
by political science research since they do not sit in parliament regularly, and as a 
consequence, do not have a major influence on political life overall (Bolleyer, 2013). 
Still, examples of small parties playing a major role at a particular - and often crucial - 
moment in political development abound.1 Understanding what makes them likely to 
persist in the party system is thus crucial to understanding the dynamics of 
parliamentary politics and government formation. In addition, excluding such parties 
from studies of the impact of financing on party behavior presents a methodological 
challenge, as it is where the impact -- we argue -- might be most pronounced.  
 This article asks the question: does state financing of parties matter? It answers 
it through an endogenous institutions understanding of how and why parties persist or 
fail. It focuses on the political parties in 14 post-communist democracies and argues 
that the party financing regime is an important institutional constraint  -- although 
clearly not the only one -- for the decision of each individual party to persist or not, 
and thus, also for the characteristics of the party systems as a whole. The post-
communist focus allows us to look for the effect of party financing in still developing 
and fluid party systems, making any impact we discern a stronger finding.  
 The results of our analysis suggest that the availability of financing is of major 
consequence for small political parties, but might have less significant impact on the 
bigger parties, making it difficult to observe a clear aggregate trend. This article, then, 
contributes to our understanding of the complex relationship between money and 
party development, but also to the more general question of party persistence and 
decline. With its party-level analysis and its focus on parties outside parliament, the 
article views the long-standing puzzle of “why parties?” (Aldrich, 1995) in a broader 
perspective and, in looking for solutions to this puzzle, goes beyond the parties’ 
electoral support as the only indication of party’s presence in society. 
 
Party Financing and Party Development: Conceptualizing the Relationship 
 Scholars are divided in their views on how party funding regulations have 
influenced party system development. Some have maintained that the presence of a 
                                                 
1 A pertinent example for such a case is IMRO in Bulgaria. The party stayed out of parliament in the 
2009 and 2013 elections but received enough votes to receive public funding (see online Appendix, 
available at http://whogoverns.eu/biography/publications/). In 2014, its re-entry into parliament (as 
part of the Patriotic Front) proved to be instrumental in the government coalition formation process in 
the country. 
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liberal regime of party funding is expected to influence the stability of the party 
system negatively by exponentially increasing the number of parties. Assuming office 
seeking ambitious, the logic is that by encouraging parties to form and/or run alone, as 
well as small parties to seek office in the long run, public funding helps increase the 
overall number of parties in the system, therefore, decreasing the degree of 
predictability-cum-stability in the structure of inter-party competition (Knapp, 2004; 
Spirova, 2007; Sundberg, 2002; Nassmacher, 2009). 
 Other scholars, on the contrary, explicitly or implicitly adopt the 
“cartelization” thesis posed by Katz and Mair according to which existing political 
parties will collusively attempt to reduce “the impact of those seeking to challenge the 
political status quo” either by introducing a system of public funding to those parties 
with a certain level of electoral support or, when already in place, by increasing the 
legal requirements for having access to those subsidies (Scarrow, 2006: 629; Biezen 
and Rashkova, 2014). The idea is that by allowing the monopoly of state resources by 
the main/relevant political parties and/or discouraging the entry of new parties to the 
system, public funding can contribute to the cartelization and, therefore, freezing of 
the party system (Katz and Mair, 1995: 15; Biezen, 2004). 
 In empirical terms, while the proponents of the latter current expect public 
funding not only to stabilize the “vote shares of parties between elections” (Birnir, 
2005: 932), but also to reduce the number of parties in the system (Booth and 
Robbins, 2010: 641-642) while at the same time being detrimental for entirely new 
and/or small parties (Scarrow, 2006: 629); the first school of thought maintains quite 
the opposite (Casas-Zamora, 2006: 44-45, 218-219; Koole, 1996: 517; Roper, 2002: 
181 or Tavits, 2007: 127).  
 Our own brief analysis of the relationship between public funding of political 
parties and their behavior at the system level points to mixed results. Following Birnir 
(2005) and Scarrow (2006), Table 1 below displays five different systemic indicators 
for party system development in all post-communist democracies, divided in two 
groups: systems with public funding of parties and systems without. The indicators of 
system stability include the level of electoral volatility (TEV) calculated according to 
Pedersen´s Index (1979), the number of new parties (NNP) entering the system, the 
number of parties winning at least 0.5 per cent of the vote (TNP), the “raw” number 
of parties winning legislative seats (NWP) and, finally, the share of parties winning 
less than 5 per cent of the vote (SPVS). 
 4 
    [Table 1 about Here] 
 All five indicators suggest a greater stabilization in the publicly funded party 
systems. The average levels of all indicators are lower in publicly funded regimes, 
indicating less proliferation of parties in them and in a way, clear support for the 
“cartelization” school of thought. But most of our cases on non-funded regimes 
coincide with earlier years of democratic development, when parties were less stable 
across the board. Further, examining the individual cases qualifies this support. If we 
compare Ukraine - the only post-communist democracy consistently denying public 
funding to political parties since the time of democratization2 - with its publicly 
funded counterparts, we see that Ukraine is neither the most volatile nor the most 
fragmented and most inimical to small parties.  
 Several observations emerge: long-standing publicly funded party systems 
tend to be more stable both in terms of volatility and fragmentation than non-publicly 
funded ones. However, public funding has not prevented: (1) electoral volatility or the 
formation of new parties in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland or Slovenia – some of 
them clearly challenging the status quo ante few months after their foundation; (2) 
electoral and parliamentary fragmentation in Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia or Slovenia; 
and, last but not least, (3) the growing importance of small parties in both Croatia or 
Lithuania. On the contrary, electoral volatility remained below the average in non-
publicly funded Estonia (1992-1995), Ukraine (2006-) or Bulgaria (1991-2000); the 
latter displayed one of the least fragmented party systems in the region; while, as 
mentioned above, Ukraine and Latvia (1995-2011) presented, respectively, the most 
inimical conditions for the appearance of new parties and the predominance of big 
parties.3 
                                                 
2 This changed in July 2016, when public funds became available for all parties obtaining at least 2 
percent of the vote. 
3 An alternative way to look for the effect of party funding on party development is to examine the 
cases where state subsidies were introduced at a later stage. This would allow us to control for other 
factors such as the institutional setting (e.g. electoral system, type of regime, etc.), economic 
conditions, historical legacies or cleavage structure. Unfortunately, and similarly to what happened in 
previous analyses, our findings seem to go in different directions (see Table C in the online Appendix). 
Electoral volatility increased after the introduction of state funding in Bulgaria, Lithuania and (to a 
lesser extent) Estonia; new party entry, system fragmentation and electoral support for small parties 
decreased in the latter two countries. In Bulgaria, however, the findings are clearly mixed: while the 
NNP and the NWP increased, both the TNP and SVPS decreased. Similarly in Latvia where the NNP 
increased and the SVPS decreased, but both the TNP and NWP maintained similar levels of 
fragmentation. Moreover, in Lithuania, Slovenia and Poland new parties have appeared before every 
election challenging the structure of partisan competition. Electoral concentration has remained rather 
low in all three, while parliamentary fragmentation in both Lithuania and Slovenia, and the vote share 
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 These observations are yet another demonstration that the relationship between 
state funding and party development is difficult to discern at the party system level. In 
fact, we argue that its empirical study has been greatly hurt by our inability to 
properly conceptualize the impact of financing on party behavior and that this needs 
to be done at the party level. This is what we turn to next.  We do that by borrowing 
the general understanding of party behavior from Spirova (2007) but taking its 
treatment of party financing as a constraint on party behavior one step further.  
Spirova (2007) sees party financing as one of the constraints on parties’ decision to 
form, persist and change. Together with other factors – party’s popularity, electoral 
thresholds, expected volatility, ideological position, and organizational complexity – 
the availability of resources is expected to determine the likelihood that a party sees a 
possibility for electoral success. We expand this argument to argue that the 
importance of the resources available – and thus of party funding – for the party’s 
decision will vary based on how the party performs/scores on the other factors. In 
particular, a party that is confident in its electoral performance might not be so 
dependent on the provision of financial resources in deciding whether to persist in the 
system or not. The impact of party financing on party thus might only be evident at 
the party level and even more – in a particular type of party – rendering the aggregate 
analysis at the system level often meaningless. 
Resource Availability and Party Development 
 As state funding provides monetary resources to the political parties, its 
availability will impact the decision of parties to form, persist and change by its very 
presence and through its specific type.  This argument is similar to Casal Bértoa and 
Walecki (2014: 342), who argue that:  
[their] intuition is that while parties relying only on private funding will 
have it difficult to survive, publicly subsidized political forces will be able 
to survive as partisan organizations even in the event of important losses of 
electoral support. 
 Direct public funding varies in terms of the basis on which it is disbursed and 
the amount of money given to parties. Some regimes restrict it to parliamentary 
parties only (further called restrictive financing regimes), while others use a certain 
electoral threshold as a cut off point for state subsidies (further called liberal financing 
                                                                                                                                            
of small parties in the latter, have not suffered significant changes since the introduction of public 
funding. 
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regimes) (Duschinksy, 2002: 80; Ikstens et al., 2002: 33–34, Nassmacher, 2009: 310-
324, IDEA 2012). The type of funding available influences the likelihood that parties 
will be able to seek office in the long term and be willing to persist in the system even 
if their goals are not achieved immediately (Bolleyer, 2013: 85; Casal Bértoa and 
Taleski, 2016: 458-461).  
 If a party is able to get financial resources even if outside parliament, and if it 
has long-term office ambitions, it will be more likely to risk staying out of parliament 
by running alone. So, the relevant electoral target of a party might become the 
threshold of the party financing regime rather than the electoral threshold itself. In 
addition, the availability of resources will influence the likelihood that a party 
believes that it will be able to turn its prospective support into actual votes and 
achieve its electoral target on its own. This is so because the party needs to carry out 
electoral campaigns and maintain an active presence in society that requires financial 
resources. As a result, a party in such situation is more likely to choose one of the 
more independent electoral strategies.  
 If public financing is restricted to parties that have parliamentary groups or to 
those that have some parliamentary presence, parties will not be encouraged to remain 
politically active outside parliament. As a result, for such parties the electoral 
threshold remains of primary significance as an electoral target and they will be less 
likely to choose a riskier electoral strategy. 
While in the above we follow most of the arguments proposed in Spirova 
(2007), here we argue that there is another aspect of the relationship that leads to an 
even more nuanced impact of party financing on political parties. While resources 
availability will be of consequence for all political contestants, it will be of most 
importance for political parties that need it the most. Parties with comfortable margins 
of support over the threshold for parliamentary representation will benefit from the 
state funding provisions, but they will also gain other benefits from being in 
parliament such as political exposure, participation in the executive, and patronage 
benefits. However, for the parties that do not surpass the electoral threshold, whether 
or not there is another threshold – the state financing one – will be of greater 
significance because it might be what allows them to maintain their political 
existence. It is then, not only at the party level (as opposed to the party system level) 
but also in that specific group of parties (parties between thresholds) that we need to 
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look for the tangible impact of state funding of political parties on their persistence or 
death.  
The arguments developed above suggest that, in empirical terms, it will be 
difficult to discern clear consequences of different types of party financing at the party 
system level. Even at the party level, it might be difficult to track such impact if we 
consider all parties as a group. Where the impact should be clear, however, is in the 
group of parties with an electoral share lower than the electoral threshold but higher 
than the payout threshold. 
These arguments lead us to propose the two following hypotheses:  
H1: Within any party system with state funding, parties that are publicly 
funded will survive to a higher extent than parties that are not.  
H2: Parties outside parliament that receive funding form the state are more 
likely to survive than parties outside parliament which are not publicly funded.  
This hypothesis reflects our argument that the impact of parliamentary status 
will be, to some extent, countered by the presence of other resources in this case 
provided by the state. 
 
Public Financing and Party Behavior in Post-communist Europe: 
Party Level Analysis 
Case Selection and Data 
The rest of the article examines the validity of our hypotheses by focusing on 
13 post-communist democracies and examining the trends in party development with 
a particular focus on the parties between thresholds.4 The empirical implications of 
the hypotheses are outlined at the end of this section.  
 The nature and regulation of party and campaign financing is a particularly 
important constraint on party behavior in the post-communist world. There, the 
establishment and initial development of the post-communist party systems happened 
at a time when public funding of parties had become the norm worldwide making 
party building and party financing develop simultaneously and impact each other 
(Roper, 2002; van Biezen, 2003: 178–179). At the same time, the party systems are 
still fluid and especially in the early years that we examine, we can be pretty certain  
in any stabilizing effect we can attribute to party financing. The region also provides 
                                                 
4 We consider a country to be democratic from the very moment it scores 2 or lower in the Freedom 
House political and civil liberties index (2015). 
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great variety of funding regimes across countries and within country variation across 
time. These different regimes and their dates in initiation are graphically presented in 
Figure 1.The variation enables us to examine the long-term effects of very similar 
funding systems, while allowing at the same time within-country comparisons over 
time between quite divergent funding frameworks.  
 Data on the specific party funding regimes is taken from the “Re-
conceptualization of Party Democracy” website and contrasted with various 
secondary sources (e.g. Biezen and Rashkova, 2014; Birnir, 2005; Piccio, 2012; 
Scarrow, 2006).  The study of the historical development (i.e. formation, persistence, 
and change) owes much to Bugajski (2002), Nohlen and Stöver (2010) and Rose and 
Munro (2009), as well as country experts and other sources on the World Wide Web. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
As Figure 1 illustrates, public subsidies to political parties in post-communist 
Europe are almost universal now, but its introduction has taken place gradually. Only 
one democratic country in the region has denied public party funding until very 
recently: Ukraine.  Of the other 13 post-communist nations seven have guaranteed 
political parties access to public funding from the very beginning of democratic 
development. Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia have maintained a restrictive system of 
public funding; Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary chose to adopt a 
liberal regime providing financing for parties outside Parliament as well.  In the other 
six Eastern European democracies, state funding was introduced only at a later stage: 
Poland, Slovenia and Estonia introduced restrictive systems in 1993, 1994 and 1996, 
changing them to liberal ones in 1997, 2000 and 2004, respectively. Lithuania (1999), 
Bulgaria (2001) and Latvia (2012) adopted liberal systems of public subsidies from 
the very first moment. 
 In order to examine to what extent public funding encourages party survival at 
the party level we look at the extent to which publicly funded parties have managed to 
survive by running in election after election. Of particular importance is the survival 
of parties whose electoral support puts them below the electoral threshold of 
parliamentary representation, but above the pay-out threshold of the state financing. 
We develop a quantitative indicator of the ability of parties to persist in the party 
system: the survival rate. The survival rate is calculated as the percentage of parties in 
each of several categories that survive from one election to the next, adapting the list 
of parties to each electoral cycle. The value of the survival rate, ranging between 0 
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and 100 is used to compare the persistence of parties across different public funding 
systems and, within systems, the persistence of different groups of parties. Since we 
are discussing trends and the numbers of observations are small, we present and 
analyse the survival rates without any statistical indicators.  In addition to the 
quantitative trends, we use a detailed qualitative discussion of several illustrative 
cases to supplement our arguments. A detailed case by case analysis of party 
development in all systems is available from the authors.  
Empirically, given the indicators and classifications above, we expect to 
observe the following:    
 - Based on H1, within any political system with state funding available, the 
survival rate of the publicly funded parties will be greater than of non-publicly funded 
parties. 
 - Based on H2,  
  a) (across systems) The survival rates of parties between thresholds 
will be higher than that of parties under both thresholds, leading to a higher rate of 
survival of extra-parliamentary parties in liberal financing regimes than in restrictive 
ones (where there are no parties between thresholds); and 
  b) (within systems) the difference in the survival rates between parties 
in parliament and parties outside parliament will be greater in restrictive party 
financing regimes than in liberal regimes.  
 We base our analysis of the impact of public funding on the behavior of 
political parties on having tracked the political life of all parties with more than 0.5% 
of the vote since the (re-)introduction of democracy in all 13 post-communist party 
systems with public funding. Table A in the (online) Appendix lists all parties per 
country that have been included in the analysis and their acronyms.  
Comparative Trends: Parties with State Money   
To look for support for our first hypothesis, we calculate the survival rate for 
parties with and without public funding in restrictive (Figure 2) and liberal (Figure 3) 
public funding regimes, based on our classifications above. The figures present the 
average values of the survival rates within categories of parties over the course of 
democratic elections in each country. Values per election round are provided in table 
B in the online Appendix.  
 In systems where public funding is available for parties represented in 
parliament only, the electoral and payout thresholds coincide and we expect to see a 
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clear distinction in the survival rate of parties above and beyond these two 
overlapping thresholds. Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia are our three examples where 
public funding has consistently been restricted to parliamentary parties only and 
where the electoral and the payout threshold are set at 5 per cent of the votes. 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 As Figure 2 illustrates, the trend in Croatia is particularly strong: there it 
seems that party funding has significantly contributed to the institutionalization of 
Croatian political parties. Only seven of the twenty-one funded and parliamentary 
parties in the 2000-2014 period did not survive to compete in the legislative elections 
of 2015, a process resulting in an average survival rate of 85.9% for funded parties.5 
In clear contrast, with the exception of two regionally-based parties (ZDS and PGS), 
all extra-parliamentary parties did not manage to survive more than one electoral 
cycle, producing a survival rate of 28.8%.6 A similar situation can be observed in 
Serbia, albeit a less pronounced difference in survival rates. But there too, most 
parliamentary and publicly funded parties have continuously survived, even if re-
aligned in different electoral coalitions, while extra-parliamentary/non-funded parties 
have found it difficult to continue in the electoral arena, except in electoral alliances 
with other previously legislative parties. Especially significant in this respect is the 
period between 2003 and 2007, when up to 6 of the 9 extra-parliamentary parties did 
not manage to participate in the next electoral contest.7 
 In consistently liberal party funding regimes the electoral and payout 
thresholds do not coincide and we can actually observe parties between the thresholds 
and use their experience to distinguish between public funding and presence in 
parliament as a factor influencing survival. But for now, we look only at the 
difference in the rate of survival of funded and non-funded parties (Figure 3). 
Hungary is the most extreme case – there the electoral threshold is set at 5%,8 but the 
payout threshold has been 1% of the votes in the first round of elections since the very 
                                                 
5 These include: KHDU, SNS, HDSS, NLIG (all four did not survive more than one electoral period); 
DC, which split from HDZ in April 2000 only to reunite fifteen years and a half later; as well as Libra 
and LS, two originally splinters of HSLS which merged into HNS (2005) and HSLS (2006), 
respectively. For a complete list of parties, their full names, and acronyms, please see the (online) 
Appendix.  
6 These are SBHS – a legislative party in 2000 that disappeared immediately after losing its 
parliamentary status in 2003.  
7 Here: LS, R-SDPV and SD immediately disappeared, while DA, SSJ and O opted for merging into 
other more relevant actors (SDP, SRS and DS, respectively). 
8 Since 1994, before it was 4%. 
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beginning of democratic politics and the difference in the survival rates of funded and 
not funded parties is the largest in our sample. Similar trends, although not so 
extreme, are clear in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania which have all had 
liberal funding regimes and in which the survival rates of publicly funded parties are 
clearly higher than for non-funded parties. 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 Lastly, we look for the difference in survival rates among funded and non-
funded parties in systems where a liberal regime was introduced only later on (Figure 
4). Here, the effect over time might not be as strong and survival rates might not be 
that different, especially as in some countries the liberal regimes are only relevant for 
2 or 3 election cycles.  But in that group of relative latecomers in the liberal funding 
regimes, the trend is also clear: parties that get public funds survive at consistently 
higher rate than parties that do not. 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 Looking at the general picture, there is clear support for all our expectations: 
there is not even one election cycle in a single system where the survival rate of those 
parties below the payout threshold exceeds the survival rate of those parties with 
access to public allocations (see also Table B in the online Appendix). The rates 
coincide, it is important to note, in just four cases (Estonia 2007, Hungary 2010, 
Serbia 2012 and Bulgaria 2013). In these instances, all parties managed to contest the 
next elections irrespective of the presence or absence of financial support from the 
state. Interestingly enough, the survival rate of publicly funded parties was always 
superior to that of the whole amount of parties at the time private funding was only 
available. Lithuania in 2012 constitutes the only exception (when compared to 1996). 
 Of course, it could be argued that because parliamentary parties (which, in 
some instances, are able to obtain extra financial public support) are included among 
those publicly funded parties, the survival rate of the latter is almost always superior 
to the one of the rest of the parties in the party system. Thus, it would be even better 
to compare the survival rate of parties that receive public funds but are not 
represented in parliament, our “parties between thresholds”, and parties that are 
neither in parliament nor receive public funds. This is what we turn to next. 
Comparative Trends: Parties between thresholds 
 To search for more convincing evidence that funding matters, however, we 
need to look at the rates of survival of political parties between and under both 
 12 
thresholds, as Hypothesis 2 suggests. Here we expect implications on both across 
systems (2a) and within systems level (2b). The first set of data – the differences in 
the survival rates of parties between thresholds and parties under both thresholds is 
presented in Figure 5.  
 The figure provides the average survival rates, per country, of parties which 
are out of Parliament and receive funding (between thresholds) and parties which are 
out of Parliament and do not receive public funds (see table B in the online 
Appendix). In 8 of the 10 cases where the relationship can be observed, we find the 
expected trend. Parties without parliamentary presence but with state funds survive at 
a substantially higher rate than parties without both. 
[Figure 5 around here] 
 Illustrative here is the case of Hungary, our most consistent liberal funder. The 
difference in the average rates of survival here is over 63 percentage points, indicating 
a much higher likelihood of survivals for the parties with funds. If we look at the 
individual development of parties in that system, of the eight Hungarian parties under 
the payout threshold in the period between 1990 and 2014, only two (MSZDP and 
VP) managed to present candidates in the next election (survival rate at 25%). This is 
in clear contrast with what has happened to the parties between the thresholds. 
Particularly interesting is the case of MKM, a hardline Marxist party established in 
late 1989, which has continuously managed to contest elections under its own label. 
As discussed elsewhere (Spirova, 2007), one of the reasons for MKM’s consistent 
presence in the party system without any major change in its organizational and 
electoral form has been the availability of state funding. Moreover, while 
“historically” important forces as FKgP disappeared from the political scene as soon 
as they failed to reach the payout threshold, newer parties such as the MDF or MIÉP 
managed to overcome their “journey in the dessert,” at least momentarily with the 
support of state finances. 
 In the Czech case, where the difference of the average survival rates is over 45 
percentage points, a similar picture emerges. In the period between 1992 and 1996, 8 
out of the 12 parties enjoying state financial support managed to survive, while none 
of the parties deprived of public funding made it into the next elections. Not happy 
with the aftermath, Czech legislators changed the payout threshold twice more: by 
increasing it by one point in 1994 and, forced by a resolution of the Czech 
Constitutional Court, by decreasing it to 1.5% in 2002. The positive effect of public 
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funding did not change much: with just two exceptions (US and VV) all parties with 
access to public subsidies survived electorally, while most of the other parties 
immediately disappeared or merged into other “more relevant” political forces (e.g. 
DEU). From this point of view, the most interesting cases are those of SNK, KDU and 
SZ. Thus, while SNK got into parliament for the first time in 2010 through an 
electoral coalition with VV, despite being left out of parliament twice before (in 2002 
and 2006); both KDU managed to return to both parliament and government in 2013, 
after receiving extensive public allocations in 2010. SZ´s survival as an extra-
parliamentary party can be very much explained thanks to the Czech State´s financial 
injection. In contrast, “historical” parties like US or the ODA felt into oblivion as 
soon as they lost the financial support of the State. 
 In Bulgaria, where liberal provisions have only introduced in 2005, the 
difference in the survival rates is not as pronounced. Again, looking at individual 
party development allows us to see a more picture. Bulgarian parties received no 
annual subsidies from the state from 1991 until 2001.  During that period, parties were 
“urged” by the electoral threshold to try to form alliances in order to surpass the 4% 
barrier necessary for legislative representation. In that period, we observe a very high 
number of electoral contestants and a great variety of electoral alliances (data not 
provided).  Of the parties that stayed out of Parliament, only a couple managed to 
survive through the period, while four out of the six parties represented in parliament 
did so.  
 In 2001, biannual direct subsidies for all parties with more than 1% of the vote 
were introduced, and that system was strengthened in 2005 when annual subsidies for 
all such parties are provided for. Since then the promise of state money has played a 
stronger incentive for the particular electoral choices of political parties (Kostadinova, 
2008; Rashkova and Spirova, 2014). It appears that achieving legislative 
representation was no longer as important for smaller parties so long as they could 
finance their operations and continue their work at the local level (Petrov, 2004). 
Where the impact of the funding provisions is clearly visible is the appearance of 
numerous new parties at both the 2005 and 2009 elections. While many of them (e.g. 
Ataka, GERB, RZS) made it into parliament, some did not and still maintained their 
political presence in the system. NV is the prime example, which failed to enter 
parliament in 2005 but secured enough funding to persist and managed to get 
numerous representatives at the local level.  The 2013 election demonstrated this even 
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further: the number of parties between the thresholds increased to unprecedented 
levels, a trend at least attributable to their unwillingness to join together. At the 2014 
elections, many of them even made it into parliament. Parties are now, in general and 
in comparison to the 1990s, much more likely to be able to sustain themselves even if 
left out of parliament as long as they receive state funds.  
 There is only one system in which the average rates do not behave as expected 
by Hypothesis 2(a): namely, Romania. However, and as it follows from the Appendix,  
parties between thresholds have been absent in most Romanian elections (i.e. 2004, 
2008 and 2012). Were we to analyse only the two elections we have complete data for 
(i.e. 1996 and 2000), the difference in favour of non-funded parties would be much 
reduced (31.7 vs. 25). In fact, while during the second pair of elections (2000-2004) 
up to 66.7 percent of the parties below both threshold did not manage to survive –
similar to what happened with the only party between the thresholds (i.e. ApR); 
between 1996 and 2000 the survival rate of parties between the thresholds was  higher 
than that of parties under them (see table B in the online Appendix), really proving 
our hypothesis wrong in just one pair of elections. 
Finally, and as it has already been mentioned, Latvia is the last post-
communist country to have granted parties access to state aid. And the effects of such 
legislative reform could have not been more dramatic, even if the contrast between 
parties “between” and parties “under” the thresholds cannot be made.9 10 
As a second empirical implication of this hypothesis we expected to find a 
positive difference in the extent to which parliamentary parties are advantaged in the 
restrictive funding regimes in comparison with the liberal ones. In Figure 6 we present 
the average difference in the survival rates of parliamentary parties and non-
parliamentary parties within each country, divided in the restrictive and liberal 
funding regimes categories. What the data tells us is that, in Bulgaria, the rates to 
which parliamentary and no parliamentary parties survived differ, on average, by 22 
                                                 
9 As it follows from the online Appendix, no extra-parliamentary party managed to get more than 2 
percent of the vote at the last 2014 legislative elections. 
10 Indeed, while until 2014 the average survival rate of parliamentary parties was of just 83.9%, all the 
parties that made into parliament in 2011 – and therefore were the recipients of state aid from January 
2012 – managed to contest the last 2014 elections. In clear contrast, only one of the exclusively 
privately funded parties survived. This is no surprising, though, as the Latvian Russian Union (formerly 
known as PCTVL) is a purely ethnic party, representing the interest of the Russian-speaking 
community in Latvia. In any case, and as it follows from table 3 below, the contrast in parliamentary 
(and publicly funded) and extra-parliamentary (and privately funded) parties in Latvia is the highest in 
the last twenty years. 
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percentage points to the benefit of parliamentary parties. In Croatia, that difference is 
substantially higher at 57percentage points.  In other words, parties in and out of 
parliament in Bulgaria’ liberal funding years (post 2001) had a more equal change of 
surviving than their counterparts in Croatia. Being in parliament by itself appears to 
benefit parties much less when state funding is not exclusively linked to it. 
[Figure 6 around here] 
 Unfortunately, looking at the overall data we cannot find a clear trend – in 
both groups of countries, we have quite some variation in the difference in surviving. 
On average, the liberal countries even score higher than the restrictive ones, a finding 
that appears to contradict our expectations. The ways to account for that are several. 
First of all, our statistic represents the difference to which these two groups of parties 
behave differently over election cycles. There are many other factors that drive the 
longevity of political parties and that are also particularly effective in their impact on 
one or other group – higher registration requirements, for example, impact small 
parties more than big parties and might prevent survival in that group. Also, we have a 
very limited number of observation for the restrictive category, making the averages 
particularly sensitive to unique country dynamics. Most importantly, it might be that 
in aggregating so much we in fact lose the focused, detailed impact of financing that 
we argue demonstrates the value of state funding for parties between thresholds.  
Conclusions 
 This article has presented a theoretical argument about why state funding of 
political parties will be particularly important to a specific group of political parties – 
those which find themselves between the electoral and payout thresholds - and 
provided empirical evidence to support this claim.  While many factors will influence 
the decision of a party to form, persist or change in the political system, state funding 
provides important resources that make running in elections and achieving the party’s 
electoral target more likely. In addition, the availability of state resources will make 
parties consider staying outside parliament as a realistic strategy as it will allow them 
to seek office in the longer run. We based this claim on theoretical arguments, but also 
on evidence presented elsewhere that, in individual party cases, party funding has 
been an important factor in the decision-making process of party elites. In the cases of 
Hungary’s Munkaspart and Centrum Party or Poland´s Social Democracy, Labour 
Union and the Democratic Party, the availability of state funding allowed them to 
persist and function in the political system although outside parliament. In contrast, 
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the absence of resources for parties outside parliament discouraged Bulgarian parties 
in the 1990s (such as the Bulgarian Euro Left) from running in elections 
independently and led to multiple electoral alliances and finally, a merger (Spirova, 
2007: 145-146; Casal Bértoa, 2016). This anecdotal evidence made us refine the 
theoretical argument but also led us into a search for a broader comparative evidence 
that the availability of state resources features as a constraint in the decisions of 
political parties to form, persist and die.  
 We have also presented arguments and data to support previous claims that the 
relationship between state funding provision and party development is ambiguous at 
the system level because of the multiplicity of factors that influence party 
development. Electoral system characteristics, ideological saturation, and parties 
organizational development also clearly constraint individual parties in their ability to 
persist and change, making it difficult to observe a trend at the system level. Several 
indicators of party system stability from the 14 post-communist countries that we 
study provide mixed evidence for a relationship of any sort. However, when we focus 
on the developments at the individual party level and particularly on the parties 
between the electoral and payout threshold, we observe a much clearer pattern. 
Comparing the trends at party level among the 13 countries with public 
finance provisions allow us to look the impact of these regimes in a more refined 
manner. We do see that parties who (anticipate to be or) are being funded by the state 
have a higher chance of forming and surviving in an independent format in the 
system. Having formulated two hypotheses to test this proposition, and discussed their 
expected empirical implications, we provided comparative analysis of the survival 
rates of different groups of parties in our 13 states and complemented that with 
detailed within country temporal analysis for several illustrative cases. The data 
provides support for two of out three empirical expectations. The survival rate of 
publicly funded parties, an indicator we calculate for each electoral period, exceeds 
the survival rate for the non-publicly funded ones in almost all cases, thus supporting 
our first hypothesis. Even more importantly for our argument, when the state provides 
funding, this allows for two distinct thresholds - the electoral and the payout one - to 
be considered as relevant by the parties. In support of our second hypothesis, we do 
observe that parties who find themselves “between the thresholds” have a higher 
survival rate than parties who do not have that option, irrespective of their electoral 
support overall. A third implication of finding a larger difference in the survival rate 
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so parties in and out if parliament in restrictive regimes was not supported by our 
evidence, possibly because of too high level aggregation.  
Still, these observations lead us to conclude that the relationship between the 
availability of state financing of parties and their development is far from irrelevant. 
On the contrary, with a proper conceptualization and multi-faceted empirical 
approach, we can discern important patterns of interactions between the two, at least 
in the empirical reality of the post-communist world. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Party funding and party system development in post-communist Europe 
Country Electoral 
period 
TEV NNP* TNP NWP SPVS 
No Public Party Funding 
Bulgaria 1991-1997 21.3 4 12.3 4.3 19.6 
Estonia 1992-1995 22.1 8 14 8 16.2 
Latvia 1995-2011 32 4 12.2 6.3 10.6 
Lithuania 1992-1996 36.5 9 16.5 11 24.4 
Poland 1991 - - 23 28 20.6 
Slovenia 1992 - - 22 8 24.7 
Ukraine 2006-2014 26.8 3 11.8 7.5 17.6 
 Average 28.6 4.5 13.8 7.6 24.2 
Public Party Funding 
Bulgaria 2001-2014 33 5.2 12 5.8 14.9 
Croatia 2000-2011 15.1 3.3 9 7 21.1 
Czech R. 1992-2013 24.7 3.5 11.9 5.7 13.1 
Estonia 1999-2015 21.2 1.6 8.8 5.8 5.8 
Hungary 1990-2014 21.4 2.5 9.1 5.9 9 
Latvia 2014 26.4 5 10 6 5.4 
Lithuania 2000-2012 35.3 3.8 13.8 9.3 17.5 
Montenegro 2009-2012 17.2 1 12.5 4.5 14.2 
Poland 1993-2011 24.8 3.2 9.8 5.3 10.9 
Romania 1996-2012 21.5 2.8 12 4.6 15.1 
Serbia 2003-2014 19 3.5 12.4 5.4 16.6 
Slovakia 1992-2012 19.5 3.8 13.1 6.1 15.3 
Slovenia 1996-2014 30.3 4.3 13.5 7.2 14 
 Average 24.3 3.4 11.4 6 13.5 
* Mergers and electoral coalitions excluded. 
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Figure 1. Public funding to political parties in post-communist Europe (1989-2016) 
 
 Sources: Casal Bértoa et al. (2014); Casal Bértoa and Biezen (2014) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Survival Rates (%) of parties in consistently restrictive funding regimes. 
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Figure 3: The survival rate of parties in consistently liberal funding regimes. 
 
 
Figure 4: The survival rate of parties in “late-comers” liberal funding regimes:
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Figure 5: Survival rate (in %) of political parties between thresholds (i.e. electoral and 
payout) and under both thresholds 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Average difference (in percentage points) in the survival rate of 
parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties in restrictive and liberal funding 
regimes.  
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Appendix (online) 
 
Table A. Party system development in 14 post-communist democracies (1990-2015) 
Country % votes 
(or in 
parliament) 
Electoral period 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 
 
 
 
Bulgaria 
 
≥4 
SDS/BSP/ 
DSP 
BSP/SDS/ 
BZNS(NS)-DP/ 
DPS/BBB 
SDS/BSP/ 
DPS/EvroLev/ 
BBB 
NDSV/SDS/ 
BSP/DPS 
 
BSP/NDSV/ 
DPS/Ataka/ 
SDS/DSB/BNS 
GERB/BSP/ 
DPS/Ataka/ 
SDS-DSB/RZS 
GERB/BSP/ 
DPS/Ataka 
GERB/BSP/
DPS/DSB-
DBG-SDS-
NPSD-
BZNS/ 
IMRO-
NFSB/BbC/
Ataka/ABV 
<4 
≥1 
BZNS(U)/BZNS(NP)/ 
SDS(C)/SDS(L)/KTB/ 
BBB/BNRP 
DAR/BKP/ 
NI/PS/TBF 
BKP/OTs VMRO-G/ 
KSII/NOTsSII 
NV/KnR/E/ Lider/NDSV NFSB/DBG/ 
DSB/Lider/ 
IMRO/ 
RZS/NDSV/ 
SDS/PV 
D21/PV 
<1 
≥0.5 
BBP/KZKS/ 
BKP/PFP 
NDKDTsB/SMSTs/B/ 
BNRP/ DPSpr 
BKhK/DPSpr. BLE/UB/ 
NSTK/NUF-L 
BKhK/FAGO Z Z/NA/ 
PROUD 
Z/RBG 
 
 
 
 
Croatia 
 
 
(Yes)1 
 
SDP-HSLS-PGS-
SBHS/HDZ/ 
HSS-IDS-HNS-LS/ 
HSP/HKDU/SNS 
HDZ/SDP-IDS-Libra-
LS/HNS-PGS/HSS/ 
HSP/HSLS-DC/HSU/ 
HDSS 
HDZ/SDP/ 
HSS-
HSLS/HNS/ 
IDS/HDSSiB/ 
HSU/HSP 
SDP-HNS-IDS-HSU/ 
HDZ-HGS-DC/ 
HLSR/HDSSiB/ 
NLIG/HSS/ 
HSp 
HDZ-HSS-
HSp-BUZ-
HSLS-HDS-
Hrast/SDP-
HNS-HSU-
HSLR/MOST/ 
IDS/B365/ZZ 
HDSSiB/NS 
   
 
(No) 
ASDH/HSP´1861/ 
NH/HPS/SDSS 
SBHS/ZDS-MS/ 
HDC-DPZS 
PGS-ZDS-ZS/ 
DSU/SU 
Zs-SP/ 
HCSP/HSP/ 
HSLS/BUZ-PGS-
HRS 
ORaH/UiO/ 
HKS-HSP-OS 
   
                                                 
1 5% threshold (at district level) does not apply to ethnic minorities. 
  
 
 
 
Czech R. 
 
≥5 
ODS/KSCM/CSSD/ 
LSU2/KDU/RMS/ 
ODA/HSD 
ODS/CSSD/ 
KSCM/KDU/ 
RMS/ODA 
CSSD/ODS/ 
KSCM/ 
KDU/US 
CSSD/ODS/ 
KSCM/ 
KDU-US 
ODS/CSSD/ 
KSCM/ 
KDU/SZ 
CSSD/ODS/ 
TOP09/ 
KSCM/VV 
CSSD/ANO/ 
KSCM/TOP09
/ 
ODS/ÚSVIT/K
DU 
 
<5 
≥3 
SD/DZJ/ 
SPCZR 
DZJ RMS/ 
DZJ 
  KDU 
SPOZ/Suv. 
SZ  
<3 
≥1.5 
KAN DEU/SD-CSNS  SNK/SZ SNK SZ CPS/SSO/SPO
Z 
 
<1.5 
≥0.5 
NzI/SPP/ 
HSS/D92 
LB/CMUS DEU/SZ RMS/SV/DZJN/C/S
NS/ 
PB/ODA 
ND/ 
SZR 
DSSS/CPS/ 
SSO/PB 
DSSS/Zmena  
 
 
 
Estonia 
 
≥5 
I-ER/Ek/ 
EK/SDE/ 
ERSP/SK/PEEK 
Ek-ERL-PK-
EPL/ER/EK/ 
I/SDE/EÜR-
VEE/VKRP 
EK/I/ER/ 
SDE-E/Ek/ 
ERL/K 
EK/ResP/ 
ER/ERL/ 
I/SDE 
ER/EK/ 
IRL/SDE/ 
EER/ERL 
ER/EK/ 
IRL/SDE 
ER/EK/ 
SDE/IRL/ 
EV/EKRE 
 
<5 
≥1 
EPL/PK/ 
EER/EEE/EVP 
PEEK/EIP/ 
EVP/ETRE 
EEKD/ 
VEE/ESE 
K/EEKD EEKD EER/ERL   
<1 
≥0.5 
ÖRRE/ 
EIL 
NJ/ERKL/ 
Metsa 
PK EIP K VEE/ 
EEKD 
EER  
 
 
 
Hungary 
 
≥5 
MDF/SZDSZ/ 
FKgP/MSZP/ 
Fidesz/KDNP 
MSZP/SZDSZ/ 
MDF/FKgP/ 
KDNP/Fidesz 
MSZP/Fidesz/ 
FKgP/SZDSZ/ 
MIÉP 
MSZP/SZDSZ/ 
Fidesz-MDF 
MSZP/Fidesz/ 
SZDSZ/MDF 
Fidesz/ 
MSZP/LMP/ 
Jobbik. 
Fidesz/ 
MSZP-E-DK-
PM-L/ 
Jobbik/LMP 
 
<5-≥4  MKM MIÉP     
<4 
≥1 
MKM/MSZDP/ 
ASZ/VP/HVK 
MKM/KP/ASZ/ 
MIÉP 
MDF/ 
KDNP/MDNP 
C 
MKM 
MIÉP-Jobbik MDF   
<1 
≥0.5 
MNP MSZDP/EKgP/ 
VP/NDSZ 
USZ FKgP  CM MKM/HNEM  
 
 
 
 
 
≥5 
LDP/TKL/LC/TB/LVP/ 
LZS-LKDS-LgDP/ 
LNNK-LZP/LSP/TSP 
TP/LC/TB-LNNK/ 
TSP-LSP-L/ 
LDDP-LSDSP/JP 
JL/PCTVL/TP
/ 
LPP-LKDS/ 
ZZS/TB-
TP/ZZS/JL/SC 
LPP-LC/TB-
LNNK/PCTVL 
SC/V/ZZS/NA
/ 
TP-LPP-LC 
SC/ZRP/V/ 
NA/ZZS/ 
SC/V/ZZS/ 
NA/NsL/ 
LrA 
 
                                                 
2 It included SZ, CSNS and ZS. 
Latvia LNNK 
<5 
≥2 
LDDP-LSDSP-T LZS/ 
DP-LKDS-LZP 
LC/LSDSP LSDSP-DP-LKDS-
LG/ 
SDLP-KP 
 LPP-LC3   
<2-≥0.5 TPA/LZs/ 
LKPP/LTF/ 
MPA-LNP/MZ-PA 
TKL/LDP/ 
LAP/NPP/ 
LVP 
LG/SDS/SDL
P/ LDP-DP-
LB-LZs/ 
KP 
VL/JD 
PSP/Mz 
PCTVL/RL/ 
PP/PPR/ 
LSDSP 
PCTVL/PP PCTVL/VL2/ 
La/JKP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lithuania 
 
≥5 
LDDP/ 
TS/LKDP/ 
LSDP 
TS/LKDP/ 
LDDP/LCS/ 
LSDP 
LDDP-LSDP-
LRS-NDP/ 
NS/LLS/TS 
DP/LSdP-NS 
TS/TT 
LiCS/LVZS 
TS/TPP/TT 
LSdP/DP/LS 
LiCS 
LSdP/TS/ 
DPTT/LS/ 
LLRA/DK 
  
<5 
≥3 
JL JL/NDP/ 
KDS/LLRA 
KDS/LVZS/ 
LKDP 
LLRA LLRA/LVZS/ 
NS/FP 
LVZS   
 
<3 
≥0.5 
LCS/LLRA/LTS-NP/ 
LLS/LLL/TPJ/ 
NJ/VPJST 
LTMA/LTS/ 
LLS/LVZS/LRS / 
LPKTS/LLaS/ 
LUP/LLL/ 
LSTS/LSP 
LCS/KKSS/ 
LLRA/LLS-
UTL/ 
LLaS/JL/LTS/ 
LPSD“2000” 
KKSS/LKD/ 
NCP 
JL/PDP/ 
LRS/LSDS 
LCP 
LiCS/TAIP/ 
SPF/KP/ 
ULL/JL 
  
 
 
Montenegro 
(Yes)4 DPS-SDP/ 
SNP/NSD/PzP 
DPS-SDP/NSD-PzP 
SNP/PCG/BS 
      
 
(No) 
NS-DSS/LPCG/ 
SPICG/SNL-SSR/ 
BMZJ/OSS/SKCG 
NS-SNL-OSS/ 
SSR-DSS/UDSH 
      
 
 
 
 
Poland 
 
≥5 
UD/SLD/ZChN/PC/ 
PSL/KPN/KLD/PL/S 
SLD/PSL/ 
UD/UP/ 
KPN/BBWR 
AWS/SLD/ 
PD/PSL/ 
ROP 
SLD-UP 
PO/PiS 
SO/LPR 
PiS/PO/ 
SO/SLD/ 
LPR/PSL 
PO/PiS/PSL/ 
SLD-SdPL-PD 
PO/PiS/ 
RP/PSL/ 
SLD 
PiS/PO/K’15 
.N/ZL/ 
PSL 
<5 
≥3 
PPPP ZChN/S/PC/ 
KLD/UPR 
UP AWSP5 
PD 
SdPL-UP   KORWiN 
Razem 
<3 
≥0.5 
ChDSP/UPR/SP/SD/ 
PCD/PPEZ/ZP/PW/ 
SN/PPE/X/RDS 
SO/X/ 
RdR/PL 
KPEiR/UPR/ 
KPEiRRP/Bd
P 
 PD/UPR/ 
RPRP/PPP 
SO/LPR/ 
PPP 
PJN/KNP/ 
PPP 
 
                                                 
3 Although entitled to state subsidies, the party dissolved itself on December 1st 2011, just one month ahead of the first payment (January 15th, 2012). 
4 3% threshold does not apply to ethnic minorities 
5 It was an electoral coalition. 
  
 
Romania 
 
≥5 
 
PNTCD-PNL/PDSR/ 
PSDR-PDL/UDMR/ 
PUNR/PRM 
PDSR-PSDR-PC/ 
PRM/PDL/PNL/ 
UDMR/PNTCD 
PSD-PC/ 
PNL-PDL/ 
PRM/UDMR 
PSD-PC 
PDL/PNL 
UDMR 
PSD-UNPR/ 
PNL-PC 
PDL-FC-
PNTCD (II) 
PP-
DD/UDMR 
   
<5/≥4 ApR       
<4/≥2 PS/PSM  PNG PRM/PNG     
<2 
≥0.5 
PSMR/ANL/PPR/ 
UNC/PNT/ANLE/ 
Pro/UR/PNDC/PNA 
PNLC/PUNR/ 
PER/PSM/PPR/ 
Pro/PMR/PLDR/PNT 
PNTCD/FDR/ 
PER/Pro/ 
PUNR/AP 
Pro PRM/ 
PER 
   
 
 
 
 
Serbia 
 
 
≥56 
SRS/DSS/DS/G17+-SDP 
SPO-NS/SPS 
SRS/DS/DSS-
NS/G17+/ 
SPS/LDP-GSS-DHSS 
DS-G17+-
SdPS-SPO/ 
SRS/DSS-NS/ 
SPS-PUPS-
US/LDP-
DHSS 
SNS-NS-PS-PSS/DS-
SdPS-DHSS/SPS-
PUPS/DSS/LDP-
SPO/G17+ 
SNS-SdPS-NS-
SPO-PS/SPS-
PUPS/DS/ND/
S-ZZS 
   
<5 
≥0.5 
DA/SSJ-NSS/O 
DHSS/“SPP”/LS 
“RSDPV”/SD 
SPO-NSS/PUPS-SDP-
“SPP”/PSS 
PSS SRS/PD/ 
“MWP”/”CP” 
DSS/PD/LDP/ 
G17+/DjB/ 
SRS/TS 
   
 
 
 
Slovakia 
 
≥5 
HZDS 
SDL´/KDH 
SNS/MK 
HZDS/ 
SDL´-SDSS-SZS/MK 
KDH/DÚ/ZRS/SNS 
HZDS/SDK/ 
SDL´/SMK/ 
SNS/SOP 
HZDS/SDKÚ/ 
Smer/SMK/ 
KDH/ANO/KSS 
Smer/SDKÚ/ 
SNS/SMK/ 
HZDS/KDH 
Smer/SDKÚ/ 
SaS/KDH/ 
Most/SNS 
Smer/KDH/ 
OLaNO/Most/ 
SDKÚ/SaS 
 
<5-≥3 ODÚ/SDSS/DS/KSU DS  PSNS/SNS/HZD KSS/SF SMK/HZDS SNS/SMK  
<3 
≥0.5 
MPP/SZS 
SZ/SPI 
KSS/ROI 
KSS/KSÚ/ 
NS/SPK/ 
HZPCS/ROI 
KSS/ZRSNS SDA/SDL´/ 
SZS/ 
NOSNP/ZRS 
ANO/HZD/ 
Nádej 
SdL´/LSNS/ 
KSS/USPS/ 
VPS 
99%/LSNS/ 
ZZ/SSS/HZD
SKSS/NaS 
 
 
 
 
 
Slovenia 
 
≥4 
 
LDS/SKD 
SD/SNS 
SLS/DSS 
ZS/SDS 
 
LDS/SLS/ 
SDS/SKD/ 
SD/DeSUS/ 
SNS 
LDS/SDS/ 
SD/SLS-SKD/ 
NSi/DeSUS/ 
SNS/SMS 
SDS/LDS/ 
SD/NSi/ 
SLS/SNS/ 
DeSUS 
SD/SDS/ 
Zares/DeSUS/ 
SNS/SLS-
SMS/LDS 
PS/SDS/SD/ 
DL/DeSUS/ 
SLS/NSi 
SMC/SDS/ 
DeSUS/SD/ 
ZL/NSi/ZaAB 
 
<4-≥3.2   
AS/SJN/ 
NSi/ 
Lipa 
 
SNS/LDS/ 
SLS/ 
PS/SNS/ 
 
<3.2 SSS/ND/SOPS/LS DSS/ZS/   
                                                 
6 Ethnic minority parties are excluded. 
≥1 LDSS/SN/KS SOPS/SF SMS TRS PSS 
<1 
≥0.5 
ZZP/Demos 
SDKS/SEG 
GOD/Smer/RZS 
LS/NSD/ZA/ 
RZS/KPS/KSU 
ZS/DSS/NS JL/ZS/ 
PS/GZS 
LPR/ZS/ 
KDS 
SMS/Zares/ 
DSD 
VERJAMEM/ 
DL/ZS 
 
 
 
Ukraine 
≥5 PR/VoB 
NU/SPU 
KPU 
PR/VoB-PVS/ 
NU-PZV/KPU/ 
NP 
PR/VoB-PVS/ 
UDAR/KPU/
VOS 
PF/BPP/S/O/ 
RP/VoB 
    
<5-≥3  VOS/KPU/SU/GP     
<3 
≥1 
PSPU/NP/PRiP 
B/PVS/SDPU (o)/PV 
SPU/PSPU UV!/NU/RP Z/PS 
 
    
<1-≥0.5 PZV/PZU/PDP/EKO VOS SPU/PPU SzU     
Sources: Nohlen and Stöver (2010), Rose and Munro (2009). 
 
Party acronyms (in alphabetic order): 
Bulgaria: ABV = Alternative for Bulgarian Revival; BBB =Bulgarian Business Block; BbC = Bulgaria without Censorship; BBP=Bulgarian Business Party; BESDP = United Social-
Democrats; BKhK= Bulgarian Christian Coalition; BKP=Bulgarian Communist Party; BLE/UB=Bulgarian Euroleft, BNRP=Bulgarian National Radical Party; BNS= Bulgarian People’s Union; 
BSP= Bulgarian Socialist Party; BZNS(U)=Bulgarian Agrarian National Union–United;  BZNS(NP) = Bulgarian Agrarian National Union–“Nikola Petkov”; BZNS(NS) Bulgarian Agrarian 
National Union (Naroden Sayuz); D21 = Movement 21; DAR= Democratic Alternative for the Republic; DBG = Bulgaria for Citizens Movement; DP=Democratic Party; DPS= Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms; DPSpr= Democratic Party of Justice; DSB= Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria; E=Evroroma; EvroLev =Euroleft; FAGO = Federation for an Active Civil Society ; 
GERB=Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria; IMRO = IMRO-Bulgarian National Movement; KnR=Coalition of the Rose; KSII=Alliance “Simeon II”; KTB = Kingdom of Bulgaria 
Federation; KTKS= “Freedom” Coalition for the Turnovo Constitution; NA = New Alternative; NDKDTsB=Kingdom of Bulgaria National Movement for Crowned Democracy; NDSV= 
National Movement Simeon the Second; NFSB = National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria; NOTsSII =National Union for Tzar Simeon II; NPSD = People’s Party “Freedom and Dignity”; 
NSTK= Alliance “National Union Tzar Kiro”; NUF-L = Natioal Union fatherland and Left ; NV=New Time; OT=Alliance for the King; PFP= Political Transformation Forum; PROUD = Proud 
Bulgaria; PS =Patriotic Union; PV = People´s Voice; RZS = Order, Law and Justice; SDS= Union of Democratic Forces; SDS(C)=Union of Democratic Forces–Centre; SDS(L) = Union of 
Democratic Forces–Liberals; SMSTsB= Kingdom of Bulgaria  Union of Monarchist Forces; SNI= New Choice  Union; VMRO-G=Gergiovden-VMRO. 
 
Croatia: ADSH = Social Democratic Action of Croatia; B365 = Milan Bandić 365-The Party Of Labout and Solidarity; BUZ = Bloc Pensioners Together; DC = Democratic Centre; DPZS = 
Democratic Prigorje-Zagreb Party; DSU = Democratic Party of Pensioners; HCSP = Croatian Pure Party of Rights; HDC = Croatian Democratic Centre; HDSS = Croatian Democratic Peasant 
Party; HDSSiB = Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonia and Baranja; HDZ = Croatian Democratic Union; HGS = Croatian Citizen Party; HKDU = Croatian Christian Democratic Union; 
HKS = Croatian Conservative Party; HLSR = Croatian Labourists-Labour Party; HNS = Croatian People´s Party; HPS = Croatian People´s Party; Hrast = Croatian Growth; HRS = Croatian 
Labour Party; HSLS = Croatian Social Liberal Party; HSP = Croatian Party of Rights; HSp = Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starcevic HSP´1861 = Croatian Party of Rights 1861; HSS = 
Croatian Peasant Party;  HSU = Croatian Party of Pensioners; IDS = Istrian Democratic Assembly; Libra = Party of Liberal Democrats; LS = Liberal Party; MOST = Bridge of Independent 
Lists; MS = Medimurje Party; NH = New Croatia; NLIG = Independent list Ivan Grubisic; NS = People’s Party-Reformists; ORaH = Sustainable Development of Croatia; OS = Family Party; 
PGS = Alliance of Primorje-Gorski Kotar; SBHS = Slavonia-Baranja Croatian Party; SDSS = Independent Democratic Serbian Party; SDP = Social Democratic Party; SNS = Serb People´s 
Party; SP = Pensioners´ Party; UiO = In the Name of the Family; ZDS = Zagorje Democratic Party; ZS = Zagorje Party; Zs = Green Party; ZZ = Human Blockade. 
 
Czech Republic: ANO = Action of Dissatisfied Citizens; CMUS = Czech Moravian Union of the Centre; CPS = Czech Pirate Party; CSNS = Czech National Socialist Party; CSSD = Czech 
Social Democratic Party; D92 = Democrats 92 for Unified Country; DEU = Democratic Union; DSSS = Worker´s Party of Social Justice; DZJ = Movement of Pensioners for Social Guarantees; 
HSD = Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia; HSS = Movement for Social Justice; KAN = Club of Active Non-partisans; KDU/CSL = Christian and 
Democratic Union/Czechoslovak People´s Party; KSCM = Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; LB = Left Bloc; LSU = Liberal Social Union; N = Hope; ND = Independent Democrats; 
NzI = Independent Initiative; ODA = Civic Democratic Alliance; ODS = Civic Democratic Party; PB = Bloc of the Right; RMS (SPR-RSC) = Republicans of Miroslav Sladek; SCPZR = Party 
of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs, Small Business, and Farmers; SD (OH) = Free Democrats; SNK = Union of Independents-European Democrats; SPP = Friends of Beer Party; SSO = Party of 
Free Citizens; Suv. = Sovereignty; SV = Rural Party; SZ = Green Party; SZR = Common Sense Party; TOP 09 = Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09; US = Freedom Union; ÚSVIT = Dawn 
of Direct Democracy; VV = Public Affairs; Zmena = Political Change Movement. 
 
Estonia: E = People´s Party (VKRP+ETRE); EEE = Estonian Entrepreneurs´ Party; EEKD = Party of Estonian Christian Democrats; EIP (TEE) = Estonian Independence Party; EIL = Estonian 
Disabled Societies´ Union; Ek = Estonian Coalition Party; EK = Estonian Centre Party; EKRE = Conservative People’s Party; EPL = Estonian Pensioners´ and Families League; EER = 
Estonian Greens; ER = Estonian Reform party; ERKL = Estonian Nationalist Central League; ERL (EME) = People´s Union of Estonia; ERSP = Estonian National Independence Party; ESE = 
Estonian Blue Party; ETRE = Estonian Farmers´ Party; EÜR = Estonian United People´s Party; EV = Free Party; EVP = Estonian Left Party; I = Pro Patria Union; IresPL = Union of Pro Patria 
and Res Publica; K = Constitutional Party; KMÜ = Coalition Party and Rural Union; Metsa = Forest Party; NJ = Fourth Force; ÖRRE = National Party of the Illegally Repressed; PEEK = 
Better Estonia and Estonian Citizen; PK = Farmers´ Assembly; ResP = Union for the Republic: Res Publica; SDE (M) = Social Democratic Party; SK = Independent Royalist Party of Estonia; 
VEE = Russian Party in Estonia; VKRP = Right-Wingers´ Party 
 
Hungary: ASZ = Agrarian Alliance; C = Centre Party; CM = Civic Movement; DK = Democratic Coalition; E = Together 2014; EKgP = United Smallholders´ Party; Fidesz = Federation of 
Young Democrats; FKgP = Independent Party of Smallholders; HNEM = Homeland Not for Sale Movement Party; HVK = Patriotic Election Coalition; Jobbik = Movement for a Better 
Hungary; KDNP = Christian Democratic People´s Party; KP = Party of the Republic; L = Hungarian Liberal Party; LPM = Politics Can Be Different; MDF = Hungarian Democratic Forum; 
MDNP = Hungarian Democratic People´s Party; MIÉP = Hungarian Justice and Life Party; MNP = Hungarian People´s Party; MKM = Hungarian Communist Workers´ Party; MSZP = 
Hungarian Socialist Party; MSZDP = Social Democratic Party of Hungary; NDSZ = National Democratic Alliance; PM = Dialogue for Hungary; SZDSZ = Alliance of Free Democrats; VP = 
Party of Entrepreneurs; USZ = New Alliance for Hungary 
 
Latvia: DP = Workers´ Party; DPS = Democratic Party “Saimnieks”; JD = New Democrats; JKP = New Conservative Party; JP = New Party; KP = Russian Party; L = Equal Rights; La = 
Latvian Development; LAP = Latvian Revival Party; LB = For Freedom in Latvia; LC = Latvian Way; LDDP = Latvian Democratic Labour Party; LDP = Latvian Democratic Party; LG = Life 
of Latgale; LgDP = Latgale Democratic Party; LKDS = Latvian Christian Democratic Union; LKPP = Party of Russian Citizens of Latvia; LNNK = Latvian National Conservative Party; LNP = 
Latvian Independence Party; LSDSP = Latvian Social Democratic Workers´ Party; LTF = Latvia´s Popular Front; LVP = Latvian Unity Party; Latvian Unity Party; LSP = Latvian Socialist 
Party; LZP = Latvian Green Party; LZS = Latvian Farmers´ Union; LZs= Union of Latvian Farmers; MPA = Political Association of the Underprivileged; MZ = Party Our Land; Mz = Mara´s 
Land; NA = National Alliance; NPP = National Progress Party; NsL = For Latvia from the Heart; PA = Anti-communist Union; PCTVL = For Human Rights in a United Latvia; PP = Last 
Party; PPR = For a Presidential Republic; PSP = Pensioners´ an Seniors´ Party; RL = Made in Latvia; SC = Harmony Centre; SDS = Social-Democratic Union; SDLP = Social-Democratic 
Welfare Party; T = Party for the Defence of Latvia´s Defrauded People “Justice”: TB = For Fatherland and Freedom; TKL = People´s Movement for Latvia; TP = Popular Party; TPA = Political 
Union of Economists; TSP = National Harmony Party; V = Unity; VL = All for Latvia!;  VL2 = All for Latvia; ZZS = Green and Farmers Union. 
 
Lithuania: DP = Labour Party; FP = “Frontas” Party; JL = “Young Lithuanians”; KDS = Christian Democratic Union; KKSS (NKS) = Christian Conservative Social Union; LiCS = Liberal and 
Centre Union; LCS (LCJ) = Lithuanian Centre Union; LKD = Lithuanian Christian Democrats; LKDP = Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party; LLaS = Lithuanian Liberty Union; LLL = 
Lithuanian Freedom League; LLRA = Electoral Action for Lithuania´s Poles; LLS = Lithuanian Liberal Union; LLS-UTL = Lithuanian People´s Union for a Fair Lithuania; LPKTS = Union of 
Political Prisoners and Deportees; LRa = Latvian Association of Regions; LRS = Lithuanian Russian Union; LS = Liberal Movement; LSDP = Lithuanian Social Democratic Party; LSdP = 
Social Democratic Party of Lithuania; LSTS = Lithuanian Social Justice Union; LTMA = Alliance of Lithuania´s Ethnic Minorities; LTS = Lithuanian National Union; LUP = Lithuanian 
Economic Party; LVZS (VNDPS, LVP)= Lithuanian Peasant and Green Union; NDP (LMP)= Party of New Democracy; NJ = Moderates´ Movement; NS = New Union-Social Liberals; PDP = 
Party of Civic Democracy; TPJ = National Progress Movement; TPP = Nation´s Resurrection Party; TS-LKD (LPS+LKP) = Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats; TT = For Order 
and Justice; VPJST = Social-Political Movement for Social Justice. 
 Montenegro: BMZJ = Bosniacs and Muslims Together, as One; BS = Bosniak Party; DPS = Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro; DSS = Democratic Serb Party; LPCG = Liberals´ 
Party; NS = People´s Party; NSD = New Serbian Democracy; OSS = Fatherland Serbian Party; PCG = Positive Montenegro; PzP = Movement for Changes; SDP = Social Democratic Party of 
Montenegro; SKCG = League of Communist of Montenegro; SNL = Serbian National List; SNP = Socialist People´s Party of Montenegro; SPICG = Party of Pensioners and Disable People of 
Montenegro; SSR = Party of Serb Radicals; UDSH = Democratic Union of Albanians. 
 
Poland: AWS = Solidarity Electoral Action; BBWR = Non-Partisan Bloc in Support of Reforms; BdP =Bloc for Poland; ChDSP = Christian Democratic Labour Party; KLD = Liberal 
Democratic Congress; KNP = Congress of the New Right; KORWiN = Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic-Liberal and Hope; KPEiR = National Party of the Retired and Pensioners; 
KPEiRRP = National Alliance of the Retired and Pensioners of the Polish Republic; KPN = Confederation for an Independent Poland; K’15 = Kukiz’15; LPR = League of Polish Families; .N= 
Modern; PC = Centre Alliance; PCD = Christian Democratic Party; PD (UW) = Democratic Party; PiS = Law and Justice; PJN = Poland Comes First; PL = Peasant Alliance; PO = Civic 
Platform; PPP = Polish Labour Party; PPPP = Polish Beer-Lovers´ Party; PSL = Polish Peasant Party; PW = Freedom Party; PPE = Polish Ecology and Polish Green Party; PPEZ = Polish 
Ecology Party-Greens; Razem = Together; RdR = Movement for the Republic; RDS = Democratic Social Movement; ROP = Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland; RPRP = Patriotic 
Movement of the Polish Republic; “S” = Solidarity; SD = Democratic Party; SdPL = Social Democracy of Poland; SLD = Democratic Left Alliance; SN = Nationalist Party; SO = Self-Defence 
of the Republic of Poland; SP = Labour Solidarity; UD = Democratic Union; UP = Union of Labour; UPR = Realpolitik Union; “X” = Party X; ZChN= Christian National Union; ZL = United 
Left; ZP = Healthy Poland. 
 
Romania: ANL = National Liberal Alliance; ANLE = National Liberal Ecologist Alliance; AP = Popular Action Party; ApR = Alliance for Romania; FC = Civic Force; FDR = Party of 
Democratic Force of Romania; PC (PUR) = Conservative Party; PDL = Democratic Liberal Party; PDSR = Social Democratic Party of Romania; PER = Romanian Ecologist Party; PLDR = 
Romanian Liberal Democratic Party; PMR = Romanian Working Party; PNA = National Party of Motorists; PNDC = National Democratic Christian Party; PNG = Party of the New Generation-
Christian Democrat; PNL = National Liberal Party; PNLC = National Liberal Party-Campeanu; PNT = National Peasant Party; PNTCD = Christian Democratic National Peasants´ Party; ; 
PNTCD (II) = Christian Democratic National Peasants´ Party (Pavelescu´s fraction); PP-DD = People´s Party-Dan Diaconescu; PPR = Pensioners´ Party in Romania; PRo = Roma Party; PRM 
= Greater Romania Party; PS = Socialist Party; PSD = Social Democratic Party; PSM = Socialist Labour Party; PSMR = Romanian Socialist Workers´ Party; PSDR = Romanian Socialist 
Democratic Party; PUNR = Romanian National Unity Party; UDMR = Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; UNC = National Union of the Centre; UNPR = National Union for the 
Progress of Romania; UR = Roma Union. 
 
Serbia: “CP” = Communist Party; DA = Democratic Alternative; DHSS = Christian Democratic Party of Serbia; DjB = Enough of That; DOS = Democratic Opposition of Serbia; DS = 
Democratic Party; DSS = Democratic Party of Serbia; “D&J”= ; G17+ = G17 Plus; LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; LS = Liberals of Serbia; “MWP” = Movement of Workers and Peasants; 
NDS = New Democratic Party; NS = New Serbia; NSS = People´s Peasant Party; O = Resistance; PD = Dveri Movement; PSS = Serbian Strength Movement;  PUPS = Party of United 
Pensioners of Serbia; RSDPV = Reformist –of the Social Democratic Party of Vojvodina-of Serbia; SD = Social Democracy; SDP = Social Democratic Party of Serbia; SPO = Serbian Renewal 
Movement; “SPP” = Socialist People´s Party; SPS = Socialist Party of Serbia; SRS = Serbian Radical Party; SSJ = Party of Serbian Unity: TS = Third Party; ZZS = Together for Serbia. 
 
Slovakia: ANO = Alliance of the New Citizen; DS = Democratic Party; DÚ = Democratic Union of Slovakia; KDH = Christian Democratic Movement; HZD = Movement for Democracy; 
HZDS = People´s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia; HZPCS = Movement for a Prosperous Czechia and Slovakia; KSS = Communist Party of Slovakia; KSU (SKDH) = Christian 
Social Union; LSNS =  People´s Party-Our Slovakia; MKDH-ESWS = Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement-Coexistence; Most = Bridge; MPP-MOS = Hungarian Civic Party; Nádej = 
Hope; NaS = Nation and Justice-Our Party; NOSNP = Independent Civic Party of the Unemployed and Injured; NS = New Slovakia; ODÚ = Civic Democratic Union; OLaNO = Ordinary 
People and Independent Personalities; PSNS = Real Slovak National Party; ROI = Roma Civic Initiative; SaS = Freedom and Solidarity; SDA = Social Democratic Alternative; SDK = Slovak 
Democratic Coalition; SDKÚ = Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party; SDL´ = Party of the Democratic Left; SdL´ =  Party of the Democratic Left (2005); SDSS = Social 
Democratic Party in Slovakia; SF = Free Forum; Smer = Direction-Social Democracy; SMK = Hungarian Coalition; SNS = Slovak National Party; SOP = Party of Civic Understanding; SPK = 
Party Against Corruption, for Order, Work and Money for All Decent Citizens; SSS = Free Word Party of Nora Mojsejová; SZ = Green Party; SZS = Green Party in Slovakia; USPS = Union-
Party for Slovakia; VPS = Cheerful Political Party; ZRS = Association of Workers of Slovakia; ZZ = Change from the Bottom; 99% = 99 Percent-Civic Voice. 
 Slovenia: AS = Active Slovenia; Demos = Demos; DeSUS = Democratic Party of Pensioners; DL = Civic List; DSS= Democratic Party; GOD = Movement for Democracy; GZS = Women´s 
Voice of Slovenia; JL = The June List; KDS = Christian Democratic Party; KPS = Slovenian Communist Party; KS = Christian Socialists; KSU = Christian Social Union; LDS = Liberal 
Democracy; LDSS = Liberal Democratic Party; Lipa = Lime Tree; LPR = List for Justice and Development; LS = Liberal Party; ND = National Democrats; NS = New Party; NSD = National 
Labour Party; NSi = New Slovenia-Christian People; PS = For Enterprising Slovenia; PSS = Slovenian Pirate Party; RZS = Republican Party of Slovenia; SD = Social Democrats; SDKS = 
Stajerska Christian Democratic Party; SDS = Slovenian Democratic Party; SEG = Party of Ecological Movement of Slovenia; SF = Slovenian Forum; SJN = Slovenia is Ours; SKD = Slovenian 
Christian Democrats; SLS = Slovenian People´s Party; SMC = Party of Miro Cerar; SMS = Party of Slovenian Youth; Smer = Direction; SN = Party of Independents; SNS = Slovenian National 
Party; SOPS = Party of Small Entrepreneurs; SSN = Party of Slovenian People; SSS = Socialist Party; VERJAMEM = Verjamem; Zares = For Real; ZaAB = Alliance of Alenka Bratusek; ZA = 
Green Alternative of Slovenia; ZL = United Left; ZS = Greens; ZZP = Association for Primorska. 
 
Ukraine: BPP = Petro Poroshenko Bloc; EKO = Party of Environmental Help “EKO+25%”; GP = Civil Position; KPU = Communist Party of Ukraine; NP = People´s Party; NU = Our Ukraine; 
O = Opposition Bloc; PDP = People´s Democratic Party; PF = People’s Front; PPU = Party of Pensioners of Ukraine; PR = Party of Regions; PRiP = Party of Free Peasants and Entrepreneurs 
of Ukraine; PS = Right Sector; PSPU = Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine; PV = Party Revival; PVS = Reforms and Order Party; PZU = Party of Greens of Ukraine; PZV = Motherland 
Defenders Party; RP = Radical Party; S = Self Reliance Party; SDPU (o) = Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united); SPU = Socialist Party of Ukraine; SU =  Strong Ukraine; SzU = 
Solidarity of Women of Ukraine; UDAR = Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform; UV! = Ukraine, Forward!; V =Viche; VoB = All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”; VOS = All-Ukrainian 
Union “Freedom”; Z = Zastup. 
 
 
Table B. Survival rate (in %) of political parties above and below the electoral threshold 
Country Above 
ET 
2nd 
election 
3rd 
election 
4th 
election 
5th 
election 
6th 
election 
7th 
election 
8th 
election 
Bulgaria Yes - - -  75 71,2 83,3 
No 33 90 87.5 100 57.1 40 66 
Croatia Yes 83.3 76.9 100 83.3    
No 0 20 20 75    
Czech R. Yes 75 83.3 100 100 100 80  
No 25 66.7 75 42.9 50 87.5  
Estonia Yes 87.5 90.9 85.7 100 100 83.3  
No 57.1 42.9 50 100 50 0  
Hungary Yes 100 100 100 100 100 100  
No 66.7 62.5 60 75 100 50  
Latvia Yes 100 77.8 100 100 85.7 100  
No 27.3 66.7 80 70 66.7 33.3  
Lithuania Yes 100 100 85.7 100 85.7   
No 66.7 60 72.7 25 55.6   
Montenegro Yes 100       
No 88.9       
Poland Yes 100 100 80 100 100 83.3 100 
No 33.3 88.9 40 50 66.7 66.7 66.7 
Romania Yes 100 100 100 100    
No 33.3 30 28.6 66.7    
Serbia Yes 100 88.9 100 84.6    
No 33.3 50 100 50    
Slovakia Yes 100 100 83.3 100 100 100  
No 70 42.9 66.7 37.5 60 85.7  
Slovenia Yes 100 100 100 100 100 100  
No 35.7 30 66.7 28.6 40 50  
Ukraine Yes 100 85.7 66.7     
No 72.7 66.7 60     
Note: ET = electoral threshold. 
 
Table C. Payout threshold changes and party system development in post-communist Europe  
Country Electoral 
period 
Payout 
Threshold 
TEV NNP* TNP NWP SPVS 
 
Czech R. 
1992 2% - - 16 8 19.1 
1996-1998 3% 22.1 2.5 10 5.5 11.3 
2002-2013 1.5% 26 4 11.8 5.3 12.5 
Estonia 1999-2003 5% 28.5 2.5 10 6.5 6.7 
2007-2015 1% 16.3 1 8 5.3 5.2 
Poland 1993 5% 28.9 4 15 6 28.1 
1997-2015 3% 25.3 3.2 8.7 5.2 7.7 
Romania 1996-2000 2% 32.5 5 17 5.5 23.5 
2004-2012 4% 17.8 2 8.7 4 9.5 
Slovenia 1996 3.2% 25.1 5 17 7 18.9 
2000-2014 1% 31.3 4.2 12.8 7.2 13 
* Mergers and electoral coalitions excluded. 
 
